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LEGISLATIVE ENTRENCHMENT
AND FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY
MICHAEL DORAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
Amid concerns about government debt, the 112th Congress passed the
Budget Control Act of 2011 to reduce the federal government’s budget deficits.1
The law set out caps on discretionary spending for each fiscal year over the
following decade and required sequestration of discretionary spending to enforce
those caps.2 It thus attached specific policy consequences to specific actions (or
inaction) by future Congresses. If, for example, Congress in 2016 exceeded the
spending caps for that year, the sequestration prescribed five years earlier would
take hold. But succeeding Congresses chafed under the strictures. With
considerable self-congratulation, the 113th Congress relaxed the spending caps
for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, the 114th
Congress relaxed the spending caps for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 in the
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, and the 115th Congress did the same for fiscal
years 2018 and 2019 in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.3 Those developments
surprised few close observers of the federal budget process. The idea that a later
Congress would adhere to significant spending caps enacted by an earlier
Congress seemed fanciful from the start.
But what if the 112th Congress had not simply set out specific policy
consequences that a later Congress could reverse but instead had purported to
bind its successors? What if the Budget Control Act of 2011 had provided that no
later Congress could repeal or modify the spending-cap and sequestration
provisions? The possibility of such legislative entrenchment presents an enduring
puzzle. For decades, legal scholars have debated whether legislative
entrenchment is possible under the Constitution and desirable as a matter of
policy. That debate has produced surprisingly limited insights. The aim here is to
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1. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (2011).
2. Budget Control Act of 2011, §§ 101, 302, 125. See also BILL HENIFF, JR. ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41965, THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011, at 11–14, 27–32 (2011).
3. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018); Bipartisan Budget Act
of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 (2015); Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-67, 127
Stat. 1165 (2013); GRANT A. DRIESSEN & MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42506, THE
BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011 AS AMENDED: BUDGETARY EFFECTS, at 6–7 (2015).
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present a fresh analysis of the puzzle through a particular focus on federal fiscal
policy.
In general terms, legislative entrenchment is legislative action that prevents
or hinders action by a simple majority in a subsequent legislature. The dominant
position among legal scholars—including Charles Black, Aaron-Andrew Bruhl,
Erwin Chemerinsky, David Dana, Julian Eule, Catherine Fisk, Paul Kahn,
Michael Klarman, Susan Koniak, John McGinnis, Michael Rappaport, John
Roberts, Stewart Sterk, and Laurence Tribe—holds that legislative
entrenchment is unwise, uncommon, and unconstitutional.4 In a prominent
criticism of that position, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule concede that
legislative entrenchment is rare but argue that it is nonetheless sound as a matter
of both policy and constitutional law.5
The two sides distinguish between what can be called “hard entrenchment”
and what can be called “soft entrenchment.” “Hard entrenchment” is legislative
action that strictly binds a simple majority in a subsequent legislature.6 A federal
statute requiring Congress to enact a balanced budget and also prohibiting
Congress from repealing or modifying the requirement, whether absolutely or by
simple majority, would be a case of hard entrenchment (assuming the prohibition
were effective). “Soft entrenchment,” by contrast, is legislative action that
impedes (but does not strictly bind) a simple majority in a subsequent legislature,
thereby making a change to the policy status quo by simple majority more
difficult or less likely than it otherwise would be. Soft entrenchment covers a
broad spectrum of possible legislative action. At one end, every statute
entrenches a policy outcome simply by setting that outcome as the status quo. A
budget passed by Congress for a subsequent fiscal year is at least modestly
entrenched because any change must overcome a legislative bias favoring the
status quo. At the other end, the Senate filibuster and the Senate rule that
nominally protects the filibuster entrench the status quo to a much greater extent;
4. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2–3 125 n.1 (2000);
Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189 (1972);
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and
the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345 (2003); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining
in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1999); Julian E. Eule, Temporal Limits on the
Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379 (1987); Catherine
Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman
and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 185 (1986); Michael J.
Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory,
89 VA. L. REV. 385 (2003) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport I]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J.
483 (1995) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport II]; John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky,
Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773
(2003) [hereinafter Roberts & Chemerinsky]; Stewart E. Sterk, Retrenchment on Entrenchment, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 231 (2003).
5. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J.
1665, 1666 (2002).
6. Admittedly, bindingness is an ambiguous concept, but as H.L.A. Hart maintained, it is “familiar
to lawyers and tolerably clear in meaning.” H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 216 (2d ed. 1994).
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defeating a filibuster requires either a supermajority coalition to invoke cloture
or a majority agreement to amend the standing rules of the Senate. Soft
entrenchment might require a subsequent majority to navigate additional
obstacles, but it ultimately does not prevent a subsequent majority from acting.
Note that, as the term is used here, legislative entrenchment is legislative
action that either strictly binds or impedes a simple majority in a subsequent
legislature. This implies three important points. First, legislative entrenchment
requires legislative action and therefore excludes structural features of the
legislative process imposed by the Constitution.7 The veto power and the
requirement of bicameralism and presentment, for example, undoubtedly
entrench the status quo,8 but they do not constitute legislative entrenchment
because they are not endogenous to the legislature. Congress cannot change
those features of the legislative process. Second, legislative entrenchment binds
or impedes a simple majority in a subsequent legislature. Every legislature must
start somewhere, and the starting point, in the absence of a contrary
constitutional mandate, is simple majoritarianism. A legislature may adopt
supermajority requirements as part of its internal structure, such as the
suspension-of-the-rules procedure in the House (which requires a two-thirds
majority) or the filibuster in the Senate (which requires a three-fifths majority).
But such structures are themselves subject to revision, and the bedrock principle
for institutional change is simple majoritarianism. Third, legislative
entrenchment affects a simple majority in a subsequent legislature. Action by any
Congress to bind or impede itself during its two-year constitutional term may
present interesting questions, but it does not present the problem of legislative
entrenchment.
The conventional academic analysis focuses almost exclusively on hard
entrenchment; scholars generally consider soft entrenchment unimportant and
uninteresting. That approach leads to analytic dead ends. The two sides debate
whether hard entrenchment is constitutional and, separately, whether it makes
for good policy. Those controversies are not easily resolved. The constitutional
analysis is problematic, with superficially persuasive arguments for and against
hard entrenchment falling apart on close examination. The policy analysis forces
a seemingly unavoidable choice between flexibility and commitment, both of
which can be attractive attributes of legislative action. But there is also a certain
pointlessness to those controversies. Hard entrenchment in federal statutory law
may not exist at all, and it probably is not even structurally possible. With so little

7. It also excludes governmental action through contracting and property conveyancing. Cf.
Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI.
L. REV. 879, 889–892 (2011) (analyzing how governments avoid anti-entrenchment rules by using private
law mechanisms to make binding precommitments).
8. See generally Michael D. Gilbert, Entrenchment, Incrementalism, and Constitutional Collapse,
103 VA. L. REV. 631 (2017); Michael D. Gilbert, Optimal Entrenchment of Legal Rules (Univ. of Va.,
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 2017-10, 2017, Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 201725, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2970164 [https://perma.cc/AT6LDHZU].
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at stake, the conventional analysis of hard entrenchment quickly devolves into an
academic parlor game.
Soft entrenchment, however, presents entirely different considerations.
Although largely ignored by the conventional analysis, soft entrenchment is
commonplace. Even if an earlier Congress does not strictly bind a simple majority
in a later Congress, the earlier Congress can make it more or less difficult for a
simple majority in a later Congress to change policy outcomes. The earlier
Congress might embed in a particular statute a provision that purports to insulate
the statute from repeal or modification, thereby making a later Congress at the
least override the anti-repeal or anti-modification provision. The earlier
Congress might also design its internal structure and procedures in a way that
makes it more difficult to change the policy status quo, such as by setting up
committees that are not representative of the full House or Senate. Such
legislative actions have entrenching effects, and once one turns to these, the
entrenchment landscape looks very different. What formerly seemed uncommon,
unwise, and unconstitutional reveals itself to be universal, unavoidable, and
constitutionally unremarkable.
Soft entrenchment is of two general types. In the first, which can be called
“deliberate soft entrenchment,” Congress enacts statutes and adopts rules for the
specific purpose of entrenching the status quo. The Budget Control Act of 2011
is a case of deliberate soft entrenchment. By establishing caps on discretionary
spending for future years and setting sequestration as the enforcement
mechanism for those caps, the 112th Congress did not actually bind its successors;
it did not even purport to bind its successors. But the 112th Congress intended to
impede majorities in future Congresses by requiring that those majorities
affirmatively suspend sequestration in order to spend in excess of the caps.
Ultimately, deliberate soft entrenchment binds a later Congress only to the
extent that the later Congress chooses to treat itself as bound. In the case of the
Budget Control Act of 2011, later Congresses have chosen to treat themselves as
bound very loosely, if at all, by the 112th Congress.
In the second type of soft entrenchment, which can be called “incidental soft
entrenchment,” Congress enacts statutes and adopts rules for the general
purpose of organizing itself and its activities. The House and the Senate have
numerous internal rules, norms, and practices that systematically, although
generally unintentionally, entrench the status quo. The distribution of agendasetting power among chamber leaders and standing committees, the
establishment of numerous veto gates, the formal and informal barriers to floor
amendments, the rules of debate, and the mechanisms for resolving interchamber differences all anchor existing policy to some degree. These procedures
are strictly necessary for the legislature to function. Institutions based on majority
rule, such as Congress, require organizational structures to stabilize policy
outcomes, and soft entrenchment is an inevitable consequence of these
structures. Because it specifically authorizes the House and the Senate to
determine their own rules of proceeding, the Constitution cannot be read to bar
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such entrenchment.
The incidental soft entrenchment attributable to legislative organizational
structures is significant in the fiscal-policy setting. The annual federal budget
process, which culminates in the enactment of twelve appropriations bills and
numerous authorization bills, is thick with institutional obstacles that frustrate
changes to the policy status quo. Often, the outcome is the enactment of one or
more continuing resolutions that carry forward existing budget policy with little
or no change. Additionally, large portions of fiscal policy—including major
social-welfare entitlements and tax expenditures—are beyond the reach of the
annual budget process. Revisions to social-welfare entitlements and tax
expenditures must overcome all the internal institutional obstacles that generally
hinder affirmative legislation action. Not surprisingly, entitlement and tax reform
occur very rarely.
Those who prefer greater flexibility in federal fiscal policy—potentially giving
Congress more latitude to reduce deficit spending, reform entitlements, and
repeal tax preferences—must contend with the problem of incidental soft
entrenchment. Fiscal policy is entrenched in part because of legislative
organizational structures. But weakening those structures in order to disentrench fiscal policy would be costly. Specifically, it would undermine legislative
stability, degrade the quality of legislative information, and frustrate legislative
dealmaking. As with so many policy problems, there are trade-offs to be made.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II examines the existing academic
debate about hard entrenchment and argues that hard entrenchment is highly
improbable. Part III examines soft entrenchment and explains further the
distinction between deliberate soft entrenchment and incidental soft
entrenchment. Part IV examines the place of incidental soft entrenchment in
federal fiscal policy. The part argues that, for better or worse, incidental soft
entrenchment brings meaningful stability to budget policy, social-welfare
entitlements, and tax expenditures. It also argues that introducing greater
flexibility by reducing incidental soft entrenchment would involve trade-offs on
institutional design and could compromise the quality of fiscal policy legislation.
II
HARD ENTRENCHMENT
The conventional analysis of legislative entrenchment breaks into two sharply
divided positions. The longstanding consensus, articulated more than fifty years
ago by Charles Black, holds that legislative entrenchment is something that, “on
the most familiar and fundamental principles, so obvious as rarely to be stated,
no Congress for the time being can do.”9 The claimed obviousness
notwithstanding, many legal scholars have detailed their objections to
entrenchment.10 In 2002, Posner and Vermeule challenged the consensus, arguing
9. Black, supra note 4, at 191.
10. See supra note 4.
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that “legislatures should be allowed to bind their successors” and that, in any
event, “entrenchment is . . . constitutionally permissible.”11
Both sides distinguish between hard entrenchment and soft entrenchment,
although they do not use those terms. For the most part, scholars consider only
the former to constitute actual entrenchment. Posner and Vermeule define
“entrenchment” as “the enactment of either statutes or internal legislative rules
that are binding against subsequent legislative action in the same form.”12 Fisk
and Chemerinsky also argue that a statute or legislative rule constitutes
entrenchment if it “binds” future legislatures.13 Dana and Koniak define
“legislative entrenchment” as “a legal hierarchy in which the will of a past
legislature trumps the will of a present legislature.”14 And Eule describes
entrenchment as “[a] legislature . . . inalterably dictat[ing] the future.”15 Both
sides recognize that every legislative act has future consequences, and both sides
recognize that, for reasons internal and external to Congress, it often is difficult
for a legislative majority to work its will. But the conventional analysis considers
those points to be qualitatively different.16 When they talk about entrenchment,
legal scholars generally refer to hard entrenchment.17
Scholars debate hard entrenchment, but that does not mean that it deserves
the attention. The concept itself is problematic. H.L.A. Hart, in considering the
consensus position that one Parliament cannot strictly bind a successor
Parliament, said that “no necessity of logic, still less of nature, dictates” that
11. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1666.
12. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1667 (emphasis added). See also Bruhl, supra note 4, at
373; Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1777–78.
13. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 250, 253.
14. Dana & Koniak, supra note 4, at 529 (emphasis added).
15. Eule, supra note 4, at 381 (emphasis added). Although Eule distinguishes between what he calls
“absolute entrenchment” and other forms of entrenchment, all his entrenchment forms assume that a
legislature prohibits certain actions by a simple majority in a subsequent legislature. Specifically, Eule
categorizes entrenchment as “absolute,” “procedural,” “transitory,” and “preconditional.” He defines
“absolute entrenchment” as entrenchment that denies a subsequent legislature the power to repeal a
statute “for all time, under any conditions, and by whatever procedure.” He says that procedural
entrenchment “entails an attempt not to bind the future irrevocably, but to prescribe the ‘manner and
form’ by which the promulgated directives can be changed,” that transitory entrenchment “seeks to
prevent alteration for a specified period of time only,” and that preconditional entrenchment “purports
to permit change only on the occurrence of a preordained event.” Id. at 384–85. Thus, even the three
non-absolute forms of entrenchment do more than simply impede action by a legislative majority: within
their terms, they purport to prohibit majority action. See id. at 384 n.14.
16. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 4, at 504–05; Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1778, 1814–
18; Sterk, supra note 4, at 232. Dana and Koniak flatly state that such effects of legislative acts should not
be considered entrenchment. Dana & Koniak, supra note 4, at 530–31. But see Posner & Vermeule, supra
note 5, at 1767 (arguing that legislative “policy choices become entrenched de facto through path
dependence and inertia”) (emphasis added). Even Posner and Vermeule, however, do not consider
legislative inertia to constitute entrenchment. Id. at 1696–97.
17. Klarman uses the term “legislative entrenchment” to refer to “the so-called agency problem of
representative government—elected representatives discounting their constituents’ preferences in
furtherance of their own perpetuation in office.” Klarman, supra note 4, at 502. By contrast, he uses the
term “cross-temporal entrenchment” to refer to the problem of a legislature binding the majority of a
subsequent legislature. Id. at 504.
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outcome; rather, “it is only one arrangement among others, equally conceivable,
which has come to be accepted with us as the criterion of legal validity.”18 Hart
exactly captures the threshold inquiry. A legal system may allow hard
entrenchment, but it is a separate question whether any particular legal system
does allow it.
In the United States, the constitutional framework for federal legislation
effectively precludes the possibility of hard entrenchment. The Rules of
Proceedings Clause, which provides that “[e]ach House may determine the rules
of its Proceedings,” makes Congress the final arbiter of its own procedures.19
Congress—and only Congress—determines whether a legislative measure has
been validly enacted.20 As a practical matter, a later Congress cannot be bound
by an ostensibly hard-entrenching statute or rule from an earlier Congress
because any legislative action by the later Congress inconsistent with that statute
or rule would be self-validating under the Rules of Proceedings Clause. In other
words, the decision of the later Congress to ignore the ostensibly hardentrenching statue or rule from the earlier Congress would have the force of law
as long as the later Congress says that it has the force of law. Any “binding” effect
of what purports to be hard entrenchment derives solely from a decision of a later
Congress to treat itself as though it were bound by the action of the earlier
Congress rather than from the action of the earlier Congress.
Consistent with that, scholars have struggled to identify meaningful examples
of hard entrenchment in federal legislation. Eule notes that instances of
entrenchment “are rare indeed.”21 Posner and Vermeule agree.22 Eule cites only
two examples: an “attempt by [the] Ohio legislature to permanently establish the
county seat of Mahoning County at Canfield” and an authorization by the 67th
Congress that a “committee investigation . . . continue until the end of the 68th
Congress.”23 Posner and Vermeule also cite the Mahoning County example and

18. Hart, supra note 6, at 149. Cf. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 35–36 (1940)
(considering various arrangements of limitation on sovereign authority).
19. John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional? Radical Textualism, Separation
of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 530–42 (2001). See also Roberts &
Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1793.
20. Roberts, supra note 19, at 542. In United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892), the Supreme
Court indicated that, subject to three specific limitations, the power of each chamber of Congress under
the Rules of Proceedings Clause is “absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.”
The limitations are: (1) that the House or the Senate may not use the Rules of Proceedings Clause to
“ignore constitutional restraints” (such as the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds vote in the
Senate to convict the president in impeachment proceedings); (2) that the House or the Senate may not
use the Rules of Proceedings Clause to “violate fundamental rights”; and (3) that any rule of the House
or the Senate must have a “reasonable relation” to the “result which is sought to be attained.” Although
those limitations might invalidate a congressional rule in a specific case (for example, if the House
adopted a rule requiring that all legislation promote the establishment of the Episcopal Church as the
official religion of the United States), none of those limitations categorically implicates the exclusive
authority of Congress to determine what legislative action has the force of law.
21. Eule, supra note 4, at 406.
22. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1693.
23. Eule, supra note 4, at 406 n.122.
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“the federal statute at issue in Reichelderfer v. Quinn, which ‘perpetually
dedicated’ certain public lands in the capital for use as Rock Creek Park.”24 One
of these involves a state statute, and the other has not been tested by a subsequent
congressional majority. Fisk, Chemerinsky, Posner, and Vermeule consider the
two-thirds supermajority requirement for changing the Senate cloture rule to
constitute entrenchment.25 But that view is not correct.26 At the very least, then,
congressional hard entrenchment is extraordinarily rare; the better view is that it
simply does not exist.
The dubious status of hard entrenchment in federal legislation raises the
possibility that the conventional analysis, however interesting and sophisticated,
is pointless. Although theoretically possible, hard entrenchment in federal
legislation is highly improbable as a matter of process and structure. One might
suppose that the conventional analysis nonetheless yields meaningful insights.
Perhaps by mooting what amounts to an elaborate hypothetical question about
hard entrenchment, the conventional analysis reaches constitutional and policy
answers about soft entrenchment. But that optimism proves misplaced. On both
constitutional and policy considerations, the focus on hard entrenchment leads
to blind alleys.
A. Constitutional Analysis
Opponents and proponents of hard entrenchment have debated its
constitutional status at length, but their analyses provide little meaningful
guidance. Consider first the textual arguments against entrenchment.27 No
provision in the Constitution expressly permits or prohibits legislative
entrenchment, so both sides have searched for indirect textual support. Roberts
and Chemerinsky argue that the Rules of Proceedings Clause provides “the best
constitutional basis for arguing that legislative entrenchment is not permitted by
our Constitution.”28 The clause, they correctly note, makes the House and the
Senate largely sovereign over their internal affairs.29 Roberts and Chemerinsky
then assert that the clause “guarantee[s] that each Congress over time will
exercise equal plenary authority over its enactment process.”30 If legislative
entrenchment were permissible, they argue, an earlier Congress (which they call
“Congress One”) would effectively “overturn” the Rules of Proceedings Clause

24. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1667. See also Bruhl, supra note 4, at 374.
25. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 245–52; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1694–95. But
see Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1780 n.20.
26. See infra Part III.A. In a final effort to identify entrenchment examples, Posner and Vermeule
point to statutory rules of statutory interpretation as “partially entrenched”—that is, as “[i]ntermediate
between . . . genuine entrenchment . . . and . . . pseudo-entrenchment.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note
5, at 1697–98.
27. Although not exhaustive, the arguments considered here are the more plausible ones put forth
in the conventional analysis.
28. Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1789.
29. Id. at 1793.
30. Id. at 1794 (emphasis in original).
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with respect to a later Congress (which they call “Congress Two”).31 They
conclude that the Rules of Proceedings Clause “guarantees that both Congress
One and Congress Two will have the full authority to structure their proceedings
as they see fit.”32
Their argument works only by assuming the point to be proven.33 The Rules
of Proceedings Clause simply does not say how it applies over time. Consider two
readings of the clause: first, each chamber of Congress can adopt rules of
proceeding that bind that chamber only for one Congress; second, each chamber
of Congress can adopt rules of proceeding that bind that chamber for more than
one Congress.34 On the first reading, it would violate the Rules of Proceedings
Clause if the House or the Senate were to impose a supermajority requirement
for legislative action by a subsequent House or Senate. On the second reading, it
would violate the Rules of Proceedings Clause if the House or the Senate were
unable to impose a supermajority requirement on a subsequent House or Senate.
The question is whether the rulemaking authority of an earlier Congress is
limited by the rulemaking authority of a later Congress (the first reading), or
whether the rulemaking authority of the later Congress is limited by the
rulemaking authority of the earlier Congress (the second reading).
Nothing in the Rules of Proceedings Clause favors one reading over the other;
both are fully consistent with the text. Roberts and Chemerinsky arbitrarily
choose the first. They assume that every later Congress must have the same
power under the Rules of Proceedings Clause that every earlier Congress has.
From there, they reason that, unless the first reading is correct, it would not be
the case that “each Congress over time will exercise plenary authority over its
enactment process.”35 But whether “each Congress over time” does or does not
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1795 (emphasis in original).
33. It is important to distinguish the argument that Roberts and Chemerinsky make from the
argument above (at pages 33–34) about the Rules of Proceedings Clause. Roberts and Chemerinsky
argue that the clause prohibits hard entrenchment—that hard entrenchment is unconstitutional because
it violates the clause. The argument above is that, whether or not hard entrenchment is constitutionally
permissible, the exclusive authority of Congress under the clause to determine whether an act of
Congress has the force of law precludes hard entrenchment as a practical matter. The difference between
the two arguments is the difference between saying that hard entrenchment is invalid (the Roberts and
Chemerinsky argument) and saying that hard entrenchment is without effect (the argument above).
34. A third reading—that neither chamber of Congress can adopt rules of proceeding that bind that
chamber even for one Congress—does not engage the question of legislative entrenchment. As such, it
is not distinct from the first reading for these purposes.
35. Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1794 (emphasis in original). Roberts and Chemerinsky
claim support for their assumption from a passage in United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892), in which
the Supreme Court refused to overturn a determination by the House that its quorum requirement had
been satisfied. The Court, in describing the Rules of Proceedings Clause, said that “[t]he power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised
by the house, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body
or tribunal.” Id. See also Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1794. Roberts and Chemerinsky read
too much into this. The passage says that an exercise of rulemaking power by Congress does not forfeit
the rulemaking power of a future Congress. It does not say that an exercise of rulemaking power by
Congress may not bind a future Congress. Reading the passage as making the second point renders it
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“exercise plenary authority over its enactment process” is exactly the question
that Roberts and Chemerinsky were supposed to answer. Once the circularity is
set aside, the analysis returns to the starting point: The Rules of Proceedings
Clause does not say whether each chamber may adopt rules that bind that
chamber across time or whether each chamber may bind itself only for a single
Congress. The clause poses the question, but it does not provide the answer.36
The non-textual arguments against legislative entrenchment are also
unsatisfactory.37 The most prominent of these maintains that legislative
entrenchment violates the constitutional principle of majoritarianism. Different
scholars make the argument in different terms, but the basic structure is the same:
Entrenchment by one Congress, which is elected to represent a particular
majority of voters, prohibits the exercise of equal sovereignty by a later majority
of voters.38 Paul Kahn puts the point this way: “Legislatures . . . may not try
directly to control future legislatures. To do so is to assert authority where there
is none. It is to transgress on the shadowy concept of popular sovereignty which
remains always inalienable and complete.”39 In other words, legislative
entrenchment intrudes on the sovereignty of popular majorities across time in
the same way that (per Roberts and Chemerinsky) it intrudes on the rulemaking
power of Congress across time.
Again, the argument is not persuasive. First, the general appeal to
majoritarianism is not dispositive because the Constitution promotes
majoritarianism at certain points, such as representation in the House, and flatly
impedes it at other points, such as representation in the Senate. The incomplete
and imperfect commitment to majoritarianism provides no guidance on questions
that the constitutional text itself does not address. Second, the argument has the
question-begging problem seen in the Roberts and Chemerinsky argument under
the Rules of Proceedings Clause. The complete authority that Kahn and others

incoherent. If the rules of an earlier Congress can bind a future Congress, the rulemaking power is not
“absolute” at all times. But if the rules of an earlier Congress cannot bind a future Congress, the
rulemaking power still is not “absolute” at all times. Again, either the rulemaking power of the earlier
Congress must yield to the rulemaking power of the later Congress or the rulemaking power of the later
Congress must yield to the rulemaking power of the earlier Congress. The Ballin passage does not answer
that question.
36. See also McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 4, at 504. Chemerinsky in an earlier article had
taken the position that the Rules of Proceedings Clause “is silent as to timing” and, thus, could not be
used as textual support for the unconstitutionality of legislative entrenchment. See Fisk & Chemerinsky,
supra note 4, at 246.
37. As with the textual arguments, the argument set forth in this section is not exhaustive of the
non-textual arguments made in the conventional analysis. For example, Fisk and Chemerinsky cite a
handful of Supreme Court decisions to conclude that “entrenchment . . . violates a fundamental
constitutional principle: One legislature cannot bind subsequent legislatures.” Fisk & Chemerinsky,
supra note 4, at 247–48. Of course, their argument then stands or falls with the correctness of the cases,
but they generally do not go behind the decisions. See also Virginia A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A
Constitutional Defense of “Entrenched” Senate Rules Governing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1, 22–24 (2004).
38. See, e.g., Dana & Koniak, supra note 4, at 531–36; Eule, supra note 4, at 394–406; Klarman, supra
note 4, at 499–501; McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 4, at 505–07.
39. Kahn, supra note 4, at 231.
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argue is held by each temporal majority is necessarily ambiguous. If an earlier
majority binds a later majority, it is clear that the authority of the later majority
is not “inalienable and complete” (to use Kahn’s phrase). But if the earlier
majority is unable to bind the later majority, it is clear that the authority of the
earlier majority is not “inalienable and complete” either. The question is whether
the principle of majoritarianism privileges the earlier majority or the later
majority. Simply pointing out that legislative entrenchment allows an earlier
majority to trump a later majority identifies the problem, but it does not answer
it.40
Posner and Vermeule correctly point out that no provision in the Constitution
expressly prohibits legislative entrenchment. Yet they can identify no provision
that expressly permits it. Posner and Vermeule suggest that the power to
entrench may be part of the Vesting Clause, under which “[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted” are vested in Congress. They reason that the Constitution does
not specifically forbid entrenchment—in contrast, for example, to the specific
prohibition on enacting an ex post facto law. That argument is weak. For the
argument to succeed, “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted” would have to
encompass all possible legislative power. In other words, Article I would have to
begin with comprehensive legislative power and then specifically exclude certain
specific powers, such as the power to enact an ex post facto law. That position is
inconsistent with the enumeration of congressional powers set forth in Article I,
Section 8.41
Posner and Vermeule also argue that the constitutional entrenchment
effected by Article V supports legislative entrenchment by analogy.42 Article V
imposes a supermajority requirement on Congress and the states for all
constitutional amendments and a unanimity requirement on the states for any
constitutional amendment changing representation in the Senate. Certainly, as
Posner and Vermeule argue, the constitutional entrenchment in Article V is a
plain indication that the Constitution tolerates entrenchment in specific cases;
and, certainly, as they argue, the constitutional entrenchment in Article V is a
plain indication that the Founders thought about entrenchment. But the
provision for constitutional entrenchment under Article V indicates nothing
about the status of legislative entrenchment.43

40. Cf. Hart, supra note 6, at 149–50 (“These two conceptions of [Parliamentary] omnipotence have
their parallel in two conceptions of an omnipotent God: on the one hand, a God who at every moment
of his existence enjoys the same powers and so is incapable of cutting down those powers, and, on the
other, a God whose powers include the power to destroy for the future his omnipotence.”).
41. Posner and Vermeule themselves do not appear to put much stock in the argument. They note
that the Vesting Clause does not address “how the legislative power, whatever that power encompasses,
is allocated over time to successive Congresses.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1674.
42. Id. at 1681–82.
43. Cf. McGinnis & Rappaport I, supra note 4, at 395 (“[T]he distinction between constitutional and
ordinary legislation is fundamental in our system, and entrenchment flouts that distinction.”). For the
same reason, the Article V argument does not support the conclusion that legislative entrenchment is
unconstitutional.
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B. Policy Analysis
The policy analysis of hard entrenchment has not been much more productive
than the constitutional analysis. The most compelling arguments made for and
against hard entrenchment pit the desirability of governmental flexibility against
the desirability of governmental pre-commitment.44 Opponents argue that hard
entrenchment necessarily reduces policy flexibility, thereby obstructing the
capacity of future legislators to work their will. Eule argues that, by transferring
authority from later to earlier legislative majorities, entrenchment “prevents
those with the greatest knowledge of societal needs from acting.”45 Roberts and
Chemerinsky find legislative entrenchment “dangerous” because it magnifies the
effects of “temporary radical majorities” in the legislature, diminishes legislative
responsiveness to “changing national consensus,” and inhibits legal reform for
“changing social and economic conditions.”46 “Good government,” they argue,
“requires that each legislature and each public majority reassess the need for new
policies.”47
Proponents reply that legislative entrenchment facilitates long-term
governmental commitments and precludes the possibility of post hoc
opportunism by future legislative majorities. Posner and Vermeule argue that
“[e]ntrenchment enables a government to make a credible pre-commitment that
it will not hold up a person (or firm or institution or country) from whom it seeks
certain actions.”48 This, they point out, reduces the costs of governmental action.49
Additionally, the proponents argue, entrenchment helps legislators commit
among themselves to resist interest-group pressure. McGinnis and Rappaport
point to the House supermajority requirement for tax-rate increases as “a modest
precommitment by the majority not to go down a road that will make everyone
worse off in the end as concentrated interest groups demand expenditures that
beggar the nation as a whole.”50 In effect, entrenchment proponents maintain that
the interests of present and future majorities can be served by a present majority’s
decision to alienate legislative policy flexibility.
The preoccupation with hard entrenchment has led scholars to frame the
policy analysis as a sharp choice between governmental policy flexibility and
governmental pre-commitment. Hard entrenchment involves policy outcomes
enacted at one time that cannot be readily changed at a later time, and it
therefore suggests, as a normative matter, a dichotomy between the flexibility to
revise those outcomes and the capacity of government credibly to bind itself

44. There are other normative arguments for and against legislative entrenchment. See, e.g., Eule,
supra note 4, at 387–88; Sterk, supra note 4, at 237–40.
45. Eule, supra note 4, at 387. See also Sterk, supra note 4, at 240–44.
46. Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1809–12.
47. Id. at 1813.
48. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1670.
49. Id.
50. McGinnis & Rappaport II, supra note 4, at 510. See also Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at
1671.
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against the possibility of such revision. But here the conventional analysis
effectively backs itself into a corner. Obviously, there are advantages both to
governmental policy flexibility and to governmental pre-commitment. Neither is
always superior or preferable to the other, and it is not necessary that Congress
pursue one to the exclusion of the other. Whether flexibility trumps precommitment or pre-commitment trumps flexibility depends on the specific
considerations presented by a particular question. There is much to be said for
pre-commitment when the government sells its debt in the bond markets; a
credible pledge against repudiation of the debt reduces the government’s
borrowing cost. By contrast, policy flexibility seems particularly desirable when
government attempts to act in areas that are sensitive to changing conditions,
such as national security. The conventional analysis thus fails to justify a
compelling policy position on legislative entrenchment. Although flexibility and
pre-commitment are important bases for assessing the stability of legislative
outcomes, the sharp dichotomy between them is neither necessary nor desirable.
III
SOFT ENTRENCHMENT
Hard entrenchment is highly unlikely, perhaps even structurally impossible.
But soft entrenchment is commonplace and, in fact, unavoidable. Congress
occasionally enacts statutes and adopts legislative rules for their entrenching
effects. Although they fall short of hard entrenchment, these statutes and rules
anchor the status quo to varying degrees. But still more interesting and more
important are the incidental entrenching effects of the basic structures and
processes of legislative organization. Every legislative body requires
organizational structures and processes to function, and they erect obstacles to
changing the policy status quo. The soft but ubiquitous entrenching effects of
legislative organization matter considerably more than the hard but hypothetical
entrenching effects that dominate the academic debate. In short, legal scholars
have missed the real significance of legislative entrenchment.
A. Deliberate Soft Entrenchment
The conventional analysis is not wrong to assume that one Congress may try
to prevent a future Congress from repealing or modifying a statute. But
entrenchment in practice is best understood as a continuum. Few scholars
recognize this point. Daryl Levinson argues that “formal, legal” entrenchment “is
clearly a matter of degree.”51 Posner and Vermeule note that different federal
statutes and legislative rules may effect different degrees of entrenchment,
although they argue that statutes and rules not strictly binding on a successor
Congress do not really count as entrenchment.52 The relevant question is not
51. Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment,
124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 697 n.128 (2011). See also Daryl J. Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political
Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 407–08 (2015).
52. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 5, at 1671, 1695, 1705.

DORAN_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE)

40

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

5/3/2018 2:16 PM

[Vol. 81:27

whether a statute or legislative rule entrenches the policy status quo but how
much it does so.
The answer depends on the deference shown by a later Congress. In theory,
the majority in every new Congress could sweep aside all the statutes and
legislative rules put in place by earlier Congresses; in practice, new majorities
leave almost all such statutes and rules in place. The reasons for doing so usually
have nothing to do with attempts by earlier Congresses to entrench their work.
Each new Congress has little time to pursue its legislative agenda, and the status
quo normally provides a tolerable basis from which to make the desired policy
interventions. But even when an earlier Congress has purported to prescribe an
outcome for a later Congress, the “bindingess” of the earlier action depends only
on the extent to which the later Congress treats itself as bound by that action.
Consider several statutes and rules put in place for the purpose of favoring
the status quo. In 1871, Congress ended the practice of making treaties with
Native American tribes; it did so by means of a statute that purported to bind
future Congresses. Section 1 of the Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871 provides
that “hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power
with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”53 The reason for the
prohibition was the House’s resentment of the Senate’s outsized role in setting
Native American policy through its exclusive power to ratify treaties.54 Although
the prohibition undoubtedly is not binding, each subsequent Congress has
honored it.55 The entrenchment here derives from the willingness of later
Congresses to treat themselves as though they were bound by the earlier
Congress.
In other cases, Congress attempts to anchor the status quo by stipulating
particular consequences for the action or the inaction of a subsequent Congress.
Consider the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (commonly
known as the “Base Closure and Realignment Act”).56 Near the end of the Cold
War, Congress determined that the United States had too many domestic military
facilities but found that closing specific facilities was politically difficult.57 The
Base Closure and Realignment Act establishes a process under which the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission reviews recommendations
of the Defense Secretary for facility closures and then submits its own
recommendations to the President.58 The President, upon approving the
recommendations, presents them to Congress.59 Unless Congress formally rejects

53. Indian Appropriations Act of 1871, ch. 120, §1, 16 Stat. 544, 566.
54. See FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 74–75 (Newton et al. eds., 2005).
55. Id. at 75.
56. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2901–26 (1990).
57. Edwin R. Render, The Privatization of a Military Installation: A Misapplication of the Base
Closure and Realignment Act, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 245, 245, 250–51 (1997).
58. 10 U.S.C §§ 2903(c)–(d), 2914(a)–(d).
59. Id. §§ 2903(e), 2904, 2908, 2914(e).
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them within 45 days, the recommendations have the force of law.60 The Base
Closure and Realignment Act was passed by the 101st Congress but prescribed
policy outcomes for the 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Congresses. Although those
subsequent Congresses could have voted to override the statute, it exerted a clear
pull on policymaking. The 102nd, 103rd, and 104th Congresses dutifully followed
the procedures laid down by the 101st Congress. Again, it is the deference of the
later Congresses that effects entrenchment.
Senate Rule XXII.2 also has entrenching effects. That rule imposes a threefifths supermajority requirement to invoke cloture for any pending measure,
other than a measure to amend the Senate Rules, and imposes a two-thirds
supermajority requirement to invoke cloture for any measure to amend the
Senate Rules. On its face, Senate Rule XXII.2 entrenches the three-fifths
supermajority requirement for cloture by setting a two-thirds supermajority
requirement to bring any change to the three-fifths requirement to a vote. For
this reason, legal scholars have cited it as the pre-eminent example of hard
entrenchment.61 But the two-thirds requirement in fact binds a current Senate
majority only to the extent that the current majority treats itself as bound. During
the second half of the twentieth century, the president of the Senate opined more
than once that a simple majority can set aside the two-thirds requirement, and
the Senate in 1975 actually (although briefly) upheld a parliamentary ruling to
that effect by a simple majority vote.62 The Senate removed all doubt on the issue
when, twice in the last five years, simple majorities set aside the two-thirds
requirement in order to amend the rules for debate on presidential nominations.63
Thus, adherence to Senate Rule XXII.2 is a function of deference, rather than
the actual bindingness of the two-thirds requirement.
Legislation aimed at controlling federal budget deficits has been less
entrenching. More than thirty years ago, Congress passed the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (generally known as the “GrammRudman-Hollings Act”).64 The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act set out specific
deficit-reduction targets and provided for automatic spending cuts if Congress
failed to meet those targets.65 Five years later, the Budget Enforcement Act of
1990 amended the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act to set limits on discretionary
60. Id. §§ 2904, 2908, 2914(e).
61. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 4, at 410.
62. John C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the
Senate Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505, 514–18 (2004).
63. Ed O’Keefe & Sean Sullivan, Senate Republicans Go “Nuclear,” Pave the Way for Gorsuch
Confirmation to Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2017; Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate
Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2013.
64. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037
(1985). The U.S. Supreme Court declared the original version of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
unconstitutional for reasons unrelated to legislative entrenchment. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736
(1986). Congress re-enacted a modified version of the statute through the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (1987).
65. MEGAN SUZANNE LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41965 STATUTORY BUDGET
CONTROLS IN EFFECT BETWEEN 1985 AND 2002, at 1–8 (2011).

DORAN_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE)

42

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

5/3/2018 2:16 PM

[Vol. 81:27

spending and to impose “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) requirements, under which
any new spending or tax decreases had to be offset in full.66 More recently, the
Budget Control Act of 2011 resurrected the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings approach
of imposing automatic spending cuts if discretionary federal spending exceeded
specific spending caps.67
All three statutes were intended to have entrenching effects. In each case, the
enacting Congress provided specific consequences if its successors enacted (or
failed to enact) federal budget legislation. But, again, the entrenchment is soft
because the mandates of all three statutes are subject to override by majority
vote. Congress set aside the strictures of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and
the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 several times during the 1980s and the
1990s. And the Budget Control Act of 2011 certainly erected no meaningful
obstacles in subsequent Congresses. For fiscal years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017,
Congress relaxed the spending caps, first through the Bipartisan Budget Act of
201368 and then through the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015.69 In February of 2018,
Congress relaxed the spending caps for fiscal years 2018 and 2019 as well.70
Even Congressional action purporting to provide for hard entrenchment
would bind a later Congress only to the extent that the later Congress treated
itself as bound. Consider again the hypothetical example of the 112th Congress,
in passing the Budget Control Act of 2011, purporting to prohibit any later
Congress from repealing or modifying the spending-cap and sequestration
provisions. As shown in Part II, that ostensible hard entrenchment would come
up short. The constitutional processes for federal legislation give Congress the
ultimate authority to determine what constitutes enactment of a law. Thus, a later
statute that repealed or modified the spending-cap and sequestration provisions
would be valid as long as the enacting Congress declared it valid. That said, the
prohibition from the earlier Congress could have soft-entrenching effects on later
Congresses.
The claim here is limited but important: in practice, actual legislative
entrenchment is soft entrenchment, and soft entrenchment is a matter of degree.
The hard entrenchment that preoccupies the conventional analysis is more
theoretical than real. But even if a legislative majority cannot be strictly bound
by its predecessor, different exercises of legislative authority can have different
entrenching effects. Congress has been more willing to work around the GrammRudman-Hollings Act and the Budget Control Act of 2011 than the prohibition
on Native American treaties, the Base Closure and Realignment, or (until
recently) Senate Rule XXII.2. These statutes and legislative rules represent

66. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). See
LYNCH, supra note 65, at 8–12.
67. Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, §251A, 125 Stat. 240, 256 (2011).
68. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–67, 127 Stat. 1165 (2013).
69. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–74, 129 Stat. 584 (2015).
70. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, 132 Stat. 64 (2018).
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different points on a continuum of soft entrenchment.71
Because fiscal-policy entrenchment—particularly regarding the budget
deficit—has been extraordinarily weak, it follows that Congress generally must
not want to consider itself bound by earlier Congresses in this area. This is not
for lack of effort by the earlier Congresses. In 1985, 1990, and 2011, Congress
enacted legislation to reduce long-term budget deficits by setting out specific
consequences in the event of certain action or inaction by a later Congress. In all
three cases, the legislation was the product of intense and prolonged negotiations
involving both political parties, both legislative chambers, and both political
branches. The critical failure each time was the unwillingness of the later
Congresses to live with the fiscal-policy outcomes provided by the earlier
Congress.
B. Incidental Soft Entrenchment
The academic debate over hard entrenchment is a sideshow; the real action is
with soft entrenchment. As shown above, statutes and legislative rules intended
to effect entrenchment work only to the extent that a later Congress chooses to
consider itself bound by an earlier Congress. Consequently, the entrenching
effects of such statutes and rules vary widely, with legislation to control federal
budget deficits having proved especially weak. But more meaningful
entrenchment often results not from deliberate efforts to entrench a specific
policy outcome but from efforts simply to organize the legislative process.
Although ignored by the conventional analysis, the basic rules and procedures
under which Congress organizes itself and conducts its business constitute
pervasive, enduring, and significant mechanisms for anchoring the policy status
quo. The entrenching effects of these legislative organizational structures is both
general and largely incidental. Even so, they are of paramount importance,
especially for fiscal policy.72
The Constitution provides little detail for the organization of the legislative
branch, so the complex internal structure of Congress is largely determined by
Congress itself. After vesting “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Congress and specifying
that Congress comprises the House and the Senate, the Constitution sets the
“Quorum to do Business” in the House and the Senate at a simple majority,
requires that the House choose a “Speaker and other Officers,” designates the
vice president as the “President of the Senate,” requires that the Senate choose

71. Although he does not distinguish between hard entrenchment and soft entrenchment, the
examples discussed by Amandeep Grewal involve soft entrenchment (or no entrenchment at all). See
generally Amandeep S. Grewal, Legislative Entrenchment Rules in the Tax Law, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1011
(2010). By contrast, Jonathan Choi mistakenly reasons that soft-entrenchment devices (such as
supermajority voting requirements) are binding once a chamber has adopted its legislative rules for a
particular Congress. Jonathan H. Choi, Tax Commitment Devices, 15 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 20–21 (2014).
72. Daryl Levinson and Benjamin Sachs analyze a different—and broader—type of soft
entrenchment (“functional entrenchment,” to use their term) effected through political mechanisms. See
Levinson & Sachs, supra note 51, 426–56. They briefly refer to entrenchment through the structures of
legislative organization. Id. at 474, 479.
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“other Officers, including a President pro tempore,” and stipulates that each
chamber must “keep a Journal of its Proceedings” and must record “the Yeas
and Nays . . . on any question . . . at the Desire of one fifth of those Present.”73
Beyond these and similar minima, the Constitution simply states that “[e]ach
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”74
The internal rules, norms, and customs adopted under the Rules of
Proceedings Clause fill in the constitutional outline. In broad terms, the
organizational structure is the same in both chambers, with three major divisions
that track the flow of legislation: committees, chamber floors, and conference
committees. The House and the Senate both use standing committees as the
principal vehicle for producing legislation.75 On the floor, measures are debated,
amended, and either passed or rejected by formal action. And ad hoc conference
committees facilitate the resolution of differences between the two chambers.76
These structures entrench the policy status quo to varying degrees. Most
importantly, these structures confer agenda control on different legislative actors,
thereby establishing veto gates in the legislative process. Because any measure
must successfully navigate all the veto gates, the dispersal of proposal power and
gate-keeping power among different legislators and different groups of
legislators increases the chance that any particular measure either will not be
enacted or, if enacted, will be modified to a position closer to the status quo.
Assume, for example, that a member of the House introduces a bill to change
the status quo on a specific issue. Success is not simply a matter of securing the
support of a majority in the House, a majority in the Senate, and the President.
First, the House committee of jurisdiction must report the bill favorably to the
floor.77 There are veto gates here: The committee chair could keep the bill off the
committee’s agenda, and a majority of the committee members could vote against
the bill.78 If more than one committee has jurisdiction over the bill or if
subcommittees have jurisdiction, the number of veto gates increases. Once
favorably reported, the bill must be brought to the floor. There are veto gates
there as well. The chair of the Rules Committee or a majority of the Rules
Committee could refuse to report a rule for the bill, and the majority leadership
could refuse to allow the bill to come to the floor.79 Once brought to the floor,
73. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 3.
74. Id. § 5, cl. 2.
75. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (3d
ed. 1997).
76. See generally LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & WALTER J. OLESZEK, BICAMERAL POLITICS:
CONFERENCE COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (1989).
77. Leadership sometimes brings a measure directly to the floor without committee consideration.
BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS 17–20 (3d ed. 2007).
78. These blocking powers are not absolute. The committee could overrule the chair’s efforts to
keep the bill off the committee’s agenda, and the Rules Committee could extract the bill from the
committee. But those mechanisms are not commonly used.
79. A majority of the full House can discharge a bill from the Rules Committee and bring it directly
to the floor. But successful use of the discharge petition is extremely rare. Also, certain bills do not

DORAN_PAGINATED (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2018]

5/3/2018 2:16 PM

LEGISLATIVE ENTRENCHMENT AND FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY

45

both the rule and the bill itself must win majority support.
Then, of course, the process begins again in the Senate, where there are
parallel veto gates. The bill must pass through the committees and subcommittees
of jurisdiction; it must be brought to the floor by the majority leader, often with
the agreement of the minority leader (but without the need to pass through a
rules committee); and it must win three-fifths supermajority support to overcome
a filibuster. From there, any differences in the House and Senate versions must
be resolved either through a conference committee or through successive
chamber floor votes. In either case, the inter-chamber resolution process
provides new opportunities for the conference committee, the House Rules
Committee, the House and Senate leadership, and the House and Senate floors
to block the bill.
The complex, interlocking, and overlapping structures of legislative
organization thus make it difficult to change existing policy. Consider just two
examples—the filibuster and the committee system. The entrenching effects of
the former are probably more salient. Under Senate rules, any senator can object
to ending floor debate on a pending measure; in that case, debate must continue
unless three-fifths of the senators vote for cloture. The filibuster ensures that a
simple chamber majority cannot bring a measure to a floor vote; instead, with
limited exceptions,80 passage of legislation in the Senate requires a supermajority.
Although filibusters were relatively uncommon until the late 1960s, today it is
generally assumed that a measure must have the support of 60 senators to come
up for a vote on the Senate floor.
The filibuster obviously entrenches the policy status quo.81 The point of the
filibuster is to allow a minority of senators to block enactment of a measure
favored by a simple majority and, thus, to impose a de facto supermajority
requirement to change existing policy. Routine use of the filibuster in the
contemporary Senate directly blocks measures that otherwise would be passed.
But the filibuster has subtler entrenching effects as well. The threat of a potential
filibuster induces sponsors to seek compromise on pending measures, thereby
moving those measures closer to the policy status quo. And even when the
filibuster does not actually prevent the passage of a measure, the filibuster slows
the Senate’s progress through its legislative calendar. Floor debate and cloture
votes take time, and, by expanding the consideration of any one measure, the
filibuster prevents the Senate from taking up other measures.82
In what may be the most infamous case of entrenchment through legislative
organizational structure, the filibuster preserved the policy status quo on racial

require a rule from the Rules Committee. But those bills, typically brought up under the unanimousconsent or suspension-of-the-rules procedure, are almost always non-controversial measures that
command unanimous or supermajority support.
80. One important exception is that, under the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974, a budget-reconciliation bill cannot be filibustered.
81. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 221.
82. But see id. at 203.
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discrimination for decades. Beginning with an anti-lynching measure in 1922 and
ending with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
filibustering senators from southern states blocked ten civil rights measures and
forced substantial compromise on five others.83 The southern senators agreed to
the relatively weak Civil Rights Act of 1957, the first federal civil rights measure
since Reconstruction, primarily out of concern that failure to pass it would
precipitate cloture reform and facilitate more robust civil rights legislation.84
Even so, the full chamber had to endure Senator Strom Thurmond’s filibuster of
twenty-four hours and eighteen minutes, the longest one-man filibuster in
chamber history.85 Seven years later, the Senate finally broke the southern
filibusters of civil rights legislation when it successfully invoked cloture after fiftyseven days of debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1964.86
The congressional committee system also has entrenching effects. The House
and the Senate both use standing committees as the principal vehicle for
producing legislation.87 Committees historically have been stronger in the House
than in the Senate,88 and, within the House, institutional reforms in the early
1970s transferred significant authority from full committees to leadership,
subcommittees, and the rank and file.89 Shorter-lived reforms of the middle 1990s
further consolidated the power of House leadership at the expense of
committees.90 And each committee always remains subject to the important but
rarely used power of the floor to strip the committee of jurisdiction or to disband
the committee entirely.91 But even at the lowest point of their institutional
influence, the standing committees still exercise primary authority over
legislation.92 The rules of the House and the Senate provide that each bill or
resolution must be referred to the standing committee of jurisdiction.93 That
committee then has the exclusive authority to report or not to report the measure
for consideration on the floor.94 Although there are exceptions,95 normal
legislative process makes each committee effectively sovereign over matters
83. GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE
Senate 117 (2010).
84. Id. at 120–21.
85. Id. at 121.
86. Id. at 122–24.
87. See generally DEERING & SMITH, supra note 75.
88. RICHARD F. FENNO JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 147 (1973).
89. DEERING & SMITH, supra note 75, at 33–39.
90. Id. at 47–52.
91. Id. at 10.
92. Id. at 6–10.
93. HOUSE RULES, H.R. DOC. NO. 114-192, X.1, X.11, XII.2 at 441–91, 539–54, 623–29 (2017);
SENATE RULES, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, XVII.1–XVII.3, XXV.1 at 12, 19 (2013).
94. DEERING & SMITH, supra note 75, at 6–10.
95. House or Senate leaders sometimes bring a measure directly to the floor without committee
consideration. SINCLAIR, supra note 77, at 17–20. Leaders occasionally change the substantive content
of a measure after it has been reported out of committee. Id. at 20–23. And, in the House, the Rules
Committee may extract a measure from another committee, or a floor majority may discharge a measure
from committee by petition. DEERING & SMITH, supra note 75, 7–8.
AND
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within its jurisdiction.
The entrenching effects of the committee system are substantial.96 The
standing committees normally determine what measures advance to the floor, a
power that encompasses two types of agenda control: proposal power or “positive
agenda control”—the exclusive ability to propose a change on any issue within
the committee’s jurisdiction; and gate-keeping power or “negative agenda
control”—the ability to block change on any such issue. Because each standing
committee is responsible to a greater or lesser extent for the status quo within its
jurisdiction, the preferred policy positions of standing committees generally are
closer to the status quo than are the preferred policy positions of the floor
medians.97 Thus, relative to non-members, committee members have a greater
preference for no change or incremental change rather than broader reform.
Both types of agenda control bias legislative outcomes toward the status quo.
By monopolizing positive agenda control, each committee pre-empts all other
legislators from advancing legislation on issues within the committee’s
jurisdiction.98 No matter how interested a legislator may be in making a policy
change, the legislator simply cannot bring a measure directly to the floor; instead,
the legislator must go through the committee of jurisdiction. If the legislator is
not assigned to that committee, she has particularly bad prospects for moving the
measure forward. Committees are jealous of their jurisdiction and do not readily
surrender policy entrepreneurship.
The chairs of the House Ways and Means Committee and the House Energy
and Commerce Committee demonstrated these entrenching effects when they
defeated the so-called “Pepper Bill” on the floor in June of 1988.99 The prior year,
Representative Pepper introduced a bill on long-term home health care.100 The
bill was referred to Ways and Means and to Energy and Commerce, the two
committees of jurisdiction, but neither took immediate action on it.101 In early
1988, Representative Pepper decided to end run the committees by having the
Rules Committee, of which he was chair, attach his bill to a separate measure
reported by the Education and Labor Committee.102 This angered Representative
96. Although they do not cast the point in terms of entrenchment, McGinnis and Rappaport
recognize the capacity of the committee system to frustrate chamber majorities. See McGinnis &
Rappaport II, supra note 4, at 497–99.
97. Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Response
to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 503 (1989); Steven S. Smith, An Essay on Sequence, Position, Goals,
and Committee Power, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 151, 157 (1988). See also Dana & Koniak, supra note 4, at
482–83.
98. That said, positive agenda control is more entrenching in the House, where non-germane
amendments are not permitted on the floor, than in the Senate, where such amendments are permitted.
99. STANLEY BACH & STEVEN S. SMITH, MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 131–35 (1988); Julie Rovner, Long-Term Care Bill Derailed – For Now, CONG. Q.
WKLY., June 11, 1988, at 1604 [hereinafter Rovner I].
100. BACH & SMITH, supra note 99, at 131; Julie Rovner, “Pepper Bill” Pits Politics Against Process,
CONG. Q. WKLY., June 4, 1988, at 1491 [hereinafter Rovner II].
101. BACH & SMITH, supra note 99, at 131; Rovner II, supra note 100.
102. BACH & SMITH, supra note 99, at 131–32; Rovner II, supra note 100.
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Rostenkowski and Representative Dingell, the respective chairs of the Ways and
Means Committee and the Energy and Commerce Committee. They recognized
the move as an attempt to usurp their proposal power, and they led the floor
opposition to the special rule for the Education and Labor bill.103 Although the
Pepper Bill was popular with the Democratic majority, Representatives
Rostenkowski and Dingell blocked it from the floor, and the policy status quo
was preserved.104
The negative agenda control held by committees often has even stronger
entrenching effects.105 The chair of a standing committee can kill a measure by
refusing to bring it to the full committee, and the full committee can kill a
measure by refusing to report it. In the House, where non-germane floor
amendments are not permitted, failure to win committee approval is almost
always the end of the matter. In the Senate, where non-germane amendments are
permitted, a legislator may attempt to end run the committee by offering a
measure as an amendment to an unrelated bill or resolution. But even then, the
committee system exercises an entrenching pull. Committees enjoy considerable
deference on the floor, and the committee chair’s stated opposition to the
amendment normally carries substantial weight. Additionally, committee
members are disproportionately represented on inter-chamber conference
committees, making it more likely that a policy change approved over the
standing committee’s objections will not return to the floor for final passage.
The Senate Finance Committee demonstrated this entrenching capacity,
again in the fiscal-policy setting, when it considered President Clinton’s first
budget proposal. In an effort both to reduce the federal budget deficit and to
improve the environment, President Clinton included in the proposal a broadbased energy tax, known as the “BTU tax.”106 As a revenue measure, the BTU
tax fell within the jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee and the Finance
Committee. After making certain modifications, the Ways and Means
Committee reported the BTU tax favorably, and the full House passed it.107 But
the Finance Committee, at the insistence of a single senator, killed the tax.
Senator Boren, from energy-producing Oklahoma, opposed the BTU tax; as a
Democratic member of the committee, his vote was necessary to report the
budget’s revenue provisions to the full Senate.108 The Finance Committee
approved the budget proposal (by a vote of eleven to nine) only after replacing
the BTU tax with a motor-fuels tax.109 The Finance Committee used its negative
103. BACH & SMITH, supra note 99, at 132–34; Rovner II, supra note 100.
104. Rovner I, supra note 99.
105. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 219 n.210.
106. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 109–10
(2d ed. 2006).
107. Id. at 110–11; White House Looks for ‘Magic Formula’ in House-Senate Conference on Budget,
BNA DAILY TAX REP., June 18, 1993, at G-4–G-5.
108. Moderates Tell Mitchell to Kill Energy Tax; Revenue Offsets Remain Open Issue, BNA DAILY
TAX REP., July 20, 1993, at G-3–G-4.
109. Senate Expected to Begin Consideration of Deficit-Reduction Package June 23, BNA DAILY TAX
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agenda control to move a pending measure closer to the policy status quo.110
IV
FEDERAL FISCAL POLICY
Federal fiscal policy tends to be stable over time. Spending programs remain
in place over long periods; tax revenues remain relatively constant as a
percentage of gross domestic product even as marginal tax rates change; and
many tax preferences endure for decades. Perhaps most notably, determined
efforts to reduce budget deficits over the long run—such as the Gramm-RudmanHollings Act and the Budget Control Act of 2011—dissipate in fairly short order.
Why should fiscal policy be so entrenched, particularly against deficit reduction?
Part of the answer lies in genuine policy preferences and political calculation. It
must be more rewarding as a legislator to spend money than to reduce
expenditures or increase revenues. But there is more to fiscal-policy
entrenchment than that. Part of the answer lies in the incidental entrenching
effects of legislative organizational structures, and that presents a conundrum for
those who prefer a more flexible fiscal policy. The same organizational structures
that tend to entrench fiscal policy also protect Congress from the chaos of pure
majoritarian rule, promote the cultivation of policy expertise, and facilitate
legislative dealmaking. In other words, there are trade-offs to consider.
Eliminating or weakening legislative organizational structures to induce greater
fiscal-policy flexibility would have broader institutional and policy consequences.
A. Incidental Soft Entrenchment and Fiscal Policy
The process set out in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control
Act of 1974 for enacting the annual federal budget is thick with institutional
obstacles that frustrate efforts to change the policy status quo, and the default
response to a failure of that process is to carry forward the prior budget.
Additionally, a substantial portion of federal spending is not even subject to the
budget process. Standing appropriations cover social-welfare entitlements, such
as Social Security and Medicare, and standing rules in the tax code cover tax
expenditures, such as the deduction for home-mortgage interest and the
exclusion for employer-provided health insurance. Changing the status quo for
social-welfare entitlements and tax expenditures requires affirmative action by
Congress, but the anchoring effect of legislative organizational structures
generally helps to keep existing entitlement and tax policies in place.
1. The Federal Budget Process
Begin with the budget process. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 sets out a multi-stage procedure for enacting a federal budget
for each fiscal year (running from October 1 to September 30). The President

REP., June 21, 1993, at G-7–G-10.
110. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 106, at 112.
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submits a proposed budget to Congress.111 The House and the Senate then pass a
budget resolution, which sets revenue and spending levels for the next five years
or more.112 The budget resolution is not presented to the President; it does not
have the force of law, although it does have binding effect for the House and the
Senate.113 Acting within the constraints of the budget resolution, each chamber
passes twelve individual appropriations bills covering various policy areas, such
as national defense, international aid, and general governmental operations.114
The appropriations bills are presented to the President and, once enacted, have
the force of law. Additionally, each chamber passes authorization bills to provide
statutory authority for the specific federal programs covered by the
appropriations bills.115 As with the appropriations bills, the authorization bills are
constrained by the budget resolution, are presented to the President, and have
the force of law. In theory, this process adheres to a tight timeline: the President’s
budget proposal is due on the first Monday of the February preceding the start
of the fiscal year; the budget resolution is to be passed by April 15; and the twelve
appropriations bills are to be completed by June 30.116 But apart from the
submission of the President’s budget proposal, these actions are rarely completed
by the statutory deadline—if they are completed at all.
The budget process is fraught with institutional obstacles that, however
unintentionally, favor the policy status quo. Foremost among these is the
fragmentation of the budget into different components that, collectively, must
run through virtually every congressional committee and win approval in
multiple votes on the House and Senate floors. The budget resolution requires
action by both the House Budget Committee and the Senate Budget Committee
and a majority vote on the floor of each chamber.117 There are numerous veto
gates here. The budget resolution must secure support from the chair of the
House Budget Committee, the chair of the Senate Budget Committee, a majority
of the House Budget Committee members, a majority of the Senate Budget
Committee members, the chair of the House Rules Committee, a majority of the
House Rules Committee members, the Speaker, the House majority leader, a
majority of the full House, the Senate majority leader, and a majority of the full

111. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 300, 88 Stat.
297, 306 (1974).
112. Id. §§ 300–01; JAMES V. SATURNO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42388, THE
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2016).
113. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§ 302(f),
311, 312, 88 Stat. 297 (1974); SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112, at 3–4.
114. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 300, 88 Stat.
297, 306 (1974); SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112, at 2–3, 12; JAMES V. SATURNO & JESSICA
TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42647, CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS: OVERVIEW OF
COMPONENTS AND RECENT PRACTICES 1 (2016).
115. See generally JAMES V. SATURNO & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42098,
AUTHORIZATIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS: PROCEDURAL AND LEGAL ISSUES (2016).
116. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 300, 88 Stat.
297, 306 (1974).
117. The budget resolution cannot be filibustered in the Senate. Id. § 305(b).
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Senate. Additionally, if the House and the Senate pass different budget
resolutions, the competing resolutions may go to a conference committee—thus
requiring agreement of a majority of the conference committee members and,
once again, agreement of the House and Senate leadership and a majority of
members on the floor of each chamber.
The problems are similar but often more intractable for the appropriations
and authorization bills. Each of the twelve appropriations bills originates with a
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee and a subcommittee of
the Senate Appropriations Committee; each bill must pass those subcommittees,
the full committees, and the chamber floors (including the possibility of a
conference committee and renewed consideration on the chamber floors). The
authorization bills originate in still more committees and subcommittees. Nearly
all of the twenty-one standing committees in the House and the twenty standing
committees in the Senate have authority over federal programs that require
authorization legislation.
Navigating these obstacles is difficult, and in recent years Congress has failed
more often than not. For fiscal years 1999, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2012, 2013,
2014, 2015, and 2017 Congress did not pass a budget resolution.118 For fifteen of
the thirty-five fiscal years beginning with 1978 and ending with 2013, Congress
was unable to pass all the appropriations bills, and for virtually every one of those
thirty-five years, Congress passed one or more of the appropriations bills after
the start of the fiscal year. Congress has passed all appropriations bills before the
start of a fiscal year only four times since fiscal year 1977.119 Of course, there often
are substantive policy disputes behind such failures, but the effects of those
disputes are magnified both by the jurisdictional fragmentation among the
budget, appropriations, and legislative committees and by the veto power of
individual legislators and coalitions of legislators at each stage of the process.
The result is a bias for the fiscal-policy status quo. In theory, the failure to
enact a budget and to pass appropriations bills forces a radical departure from
the status quo—a shutdown of government operations.120 But shutdowns, despite
their political salience, rarely happen. Since the enactment of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, there have been about eighteen full or
partial shutdowns of the federal government, most of them lasting fewer than ten
days.121 By far the more common response to a breakdown in the budget process
has been the passage of continuing resolutions that generally provide for ongoing
appropriations at or near the levels set under the most recent budget and that

118. SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112, at 4. One or both chambers typically mitigate the failure to
pass a budget resolution by deeming other legislation to serve the function of a budget resolution. See
generally MEGAN S. LYNCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44296, DEEMING RESOLUTIONS: BUDGET
ENFORCEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A BUDGET RESOLUTION (2015).
119. SATURNO, ET AL., supra note 112, at 13; Saturno & Tollestrup, supra note 114, at 1.
120. CLINTON T. BRASS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS 3 (2017).
121. See generally id.
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generally prohibit use of appropriated funds for new programs or activities.122
Continuing resolutions, by design, carry forward the policy status quo.123 During
the forty fiscal years starting with 1977 and ending with 2016, Congress passed
175 continuing resolutions that fully or partially funded government operations
for a total of 8,064 days—the equivalent of more than twenty-two fiscal years.124
In short, the legislative organizational structures that shape the federal
budget process tend to entrench the status quo. The budget resolution, the
appropriations bills, and the authorization bills that collectively make up the
federal budget must pass through virtually every committee in Congress—the
same committees that put the status quo in place. Any departure from the status
quo must navigate numerous veto gates. And when the process breaks down, as
it often does, the preferred strategy is to enact a continuing resolution so that the
budget status quo is held in place until the process successfully produces a new
budget.
2. Social-Welfare Entitlements and Tax Expenditures
Although it often defaults to continuing resolutions, the budget process in
theory requires Congress to revisit certain segments of federal spending every
year. By contrast, other segments of fiscal policy—specifically, those providing
funding for major social-welfare entitlements and tax expenditures—are not part
of the regular budget process and are beyond the reach of annual
appropriations.125 Any change to the status quo for social-welfare entitlements
and tax expenditures requires affirmative congressional action that must
negotiate the institutional obstacles created by legislative organizational
structures.
Consider the two largest social-welfare entitlement programs, Social Security
and Medicare. The federal government paid out $911.4 billion in Social Security
benefits during 2016.126 Those benefits were not subject to annual appropriation;
instead, they were funded through a broad-based wage tax, a modest benefits tax,
and interest earned by the program’s two trust funds.127 The federal government
paid out $669.5 billion in benefits under Medicare Parts A, B, and D during
2016.128 Less than half that amount, $319.2 billion, was funded through the annual
appropriations process; the remainder was funded through a broad-based wage
tax, a modest benefits tax, premiums charged to beneficiaries, modest transfers
122. SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112, at 13–14; SATURNO & TOLLESTRUP, supra note 114, at 3–7.
123. But see SATURNO & TOLLESTRUP, supra note 114, at 8–9.
124. Id. at 19–30.
125. In total, more than half of annual federal spending is outside the regular budget process. CTR.
ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET
PROCESS 3 (2017); SATURNO ET AL., supra note 112.
126. THE 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND
SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 7 (2017).
127. Id. at 7–8. For 2016, there was a reimbursement of just under $100 million made to Social
Security from general federal revenues. Id.
128. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 10.
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from the states, and interest on the program’s trust funds.129 Thus, $1.2617 trillion
in spending under these two programs was not subject to review and approval by
Congress through the annual budget process. Instead, the payments were made
under laws enacted many years ago.
Similarly, the federal government spends large amounts each year through
tax expenditures, rules in the tax code providing preferential treatment for
particular taxpayers or for taxpayers engaged in particular activities. Like much
of the social-welfare spending under Social Security and Medicare, tax
expenditures fall outside the appropriations process and, thus, are not subject to
annual review and approval by Congress.130 The total spent each year through tax
expenditures is hard to determine. One estimate puts the amount for 2015 at
$1.399 trillion,131 but this figure is problematic. Tax expenditures have incentive
effects that change behavior, and they interact with other provisions in the tax
code.132 Thus, enacting or repealing a $1 billion tax expenditure would not
necessarily decrease or increase federal revenues by $1 billion, once all the
relevant behavioral changes and interactions were accounted for. But certainly
tax expenditures are sizable. For 2016, the cost of excluding employer-provided
health insurance was $155.3 billion, the cost of taxing long-term capital gains and
corporate dividends at a reduced rate was $130.9 billion, the cost of deferring
non-U.S. earnings by U.S. corporations was $102.7 billion, and the cost of
deducting state and local property taxes was $31.2 billion.133
Federal spending through social-welfare entitlements and tax expenditures
represents an entrenched segment of federal fiscal policy. It is not that Congress
cannot change these spending programs but that changing these spending
programs is institutionally difficult. And changing them is difficult not because
Congress has erected barriers around the programs with the specific intention of
entrenching them but simply because Congress has organized itself in such a way
as to inhibit affirmative legislative action. The structures of legislative
organization result in an unintentional yet still meaningful bias for the status quo.
The last major revision to Social Security occurred thirty-five years ago, in 1983,
when the program was about to default on benefit payments.134 The last major
revision to Medicare occurred fifteen years ago, in 2003, and that revision had
the effect of increasing annual spending through the addition of a prescription-

129. Id. at 10–11.
130. Certain tax expenditures have statutory expiration (or “sunset”) dates, and renewal of those tax
expenditures requires affirmative legislative action. See generally JOINT COMM. OF TAXATION, LIST OF
EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS 2016–2026 (2017). For a broader analysis, see generally George
K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
174 (2009).
131. ALAN COLE, CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL TAX EXPENDITURES 5 (Melodie Bowler ed., The
Tax Found. 2015).
132. U.S. TREAS. DEP’T OFF. OF TAX ANALYSIS, TAX EXPENDITURES 1–2 (2015).
133. JOINT COMM. OF TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2016–2020, at 28, 32, 33, 37 (2017).
134. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983).
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drug benefit.135 And prior to the enactment of the Tax Cut and Jobs Act in
December 2017,136 it had been thirty-one years since the last major revision to the
tax code to repeal or modify tax expenditures on a substantial scale.137
B. The Costs of Dis-Entrenching Fiscal Policy
There are cogent arguments for different policy positions on the federal
budget deficit, social-welfare entitlements, and tax expenditures. The point here
is not to argue that Congress should or should not reduce the deficit, that
Congress should or should not reform entitlements, or that Congress should or
should not repeal tax expenditures. But assume for the purpose of analysis that
one simply wanted Congress to have greater latitude to change these elements of
fiscal policy. Successful dis-entrenchment of deficit spending, entitlements, and
tax preferences would require weakening important legislative organizational
structures such as the committee system, internal managerial hierarchies, and
voting procedures. That would be costly. Legislative organization has a life of its
own—desirable in some respects and undesirable in others—that is completely
independent of its entrenching effects. These structures provide institutional
stability against position cycling, encourage specialization and the development
of policy expertise, and facilitate durable agreements; consequently, weakening
them would increase chaos on the chamber floors, degrade the quality of
legislative information, and frustrate dealmaking among legislators.
1. Internal Legislative Stability
The structures of legislative organization induce stability in Congress. Begin
with the possibility of instability. Arrow’s Theorem holds that, under
straightforward conditions for democratic action, majority voting readily yields
open-ended cycling among any three or more policy options.138 The theorem
implies that, except in the uncommon case of a Condorcet winner, legislators
must compromise pure majoritarian rule in order to avoid legislative chaos.139
Following Arrow, William Riker demonstrated the instability of political
coalitions and offered compelling historical evidence of manipulated position
cycling among such coalitions.140 Charles Plott showed that, in the absence of a
Condorcet winner, voting yields non-cyclical results only when the individual
preferences of legislators are perfectly symmetrical,141 an extreme rarity in
135. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
136. An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution
on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
137. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
138. See also PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION 56–65 (1986). See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL
VALUES (1951).
139. ORDESHOOK, supra note 138, at 62–65.
140. WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 214–53 (1982) [hereinafter RIKER I].
141. Charles R. Plott, A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility under Majority Rule, 57 AM. ECON.
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multidimensional policy space.142 Richard McKelvey demonstrated that, if
legislators vote sincerely, an agenda setter can construct a series of pairwise votes
leading to any outcome, thereby using the voting agenda to control policy.143
Subsequent analysis showed that even sophisticated voting imposes only loose
constraints on the agenda setter’s ability to manipulate legislative results.144 Thus,
the implementation of pure majority rule generally fails to produce durable
equilibria.145
But why, if the outcomes of social choice are inherently unstable, do
legislative bodies such as Congress demonstrate high levels of stability?146
Kenneth Shepsle argues that specific institutional structures anchor collective
decision-making.147 He shows that the committee system and restrictiveamendment procedures combine with heterogeneous preferences to produce
“structure-induced equilibria.”148 In effect, Shepsle domesticates the chaos
implied by rational-choice theory; he demonstrates the possibility of legislative
stability through institutional arrangements that restrict the domain of available
policy options.149 Shepsle’s argument has led political scientists to re-examine the
structural features of Congress that ground stability and that affect the
substantive content of policy outcomes.150
REV. 787 (1967).
142. William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of
Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 441 (1980) [hereinafter Riker II]; Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry
A. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 504 (1981)
[hereinafter Shepsle & Weingast I].
143. Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications
for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 481 (1976). See also Richard D. McKelvey, General
Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1085 (1979); Norman
Schofield, Instability of Simple Dynamic Games, 45 REV. ECON. STUD. 575 (1978).
144. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes
with Implications for Agenda Institutions, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 49, 58–68 (1984). See also Morris P. Fiorina
& Kenneth A. Shepsle, Formal Theories of Leadership: Agents, Agenda Setters, and Entrepreneurs, in
LEADERSHIP AND POLITICS: NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 30 (Bryan D. Jones ed., 1989).
145. Shepsle & Weingast I, supra note 142, at 504–07. See also Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R.
Weingast, Institutionalizing Majority Rule: A Social Choice Theory with Policy Implications, 72 AM.
ECON. REV. 367, 368 (1982) [hereinafter Shepsle & Weingast II].
146. See William H. Panning, Formal Models of Legislative Processes, 8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 427, 438
(1983).
147. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting
Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27, 27 (1979).
148. Id. at 47–55. A “structure-induced equilibrium” is a point in multidimensional policy space with
respect to which the only other points that could defeat that point “either can be proposed only by those
who do not prefer to do so, or cannot be proposed at all.” Shepsle & Weingast I, supra note 142, at 512.
The committee system and restrictive-amendment procedures are not the only institutional arrangements
that can produce structure-induced equilibria. Id. at 513–14.
149. Shepsle, supra note 147, at 47–55. See also Riker II, supra note 142, at 443–44; Shepsle &
Weingast I, supra note 142, at 507–11; Shepsle & Weingast II, supra note 145, at 368.
150. ERIC SHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 5–12 (2001); Gary W. Cox & Matthew D. McCubbins, Theories
of Legislative Organization, 15 APSA-CP NEWSL. 1, 9 (2004); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast,
Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions, in POSITIVE THEORIES OF CONGRESSIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 10–21 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast eds., 1995) [hereinafter Shepsle &
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Institutional analysis therefore implies that some level of incidental soft
entrenchment is unavoidable. Congress must have organizational structures in
order to function. The same institutional structures that incidentally perpetuate
budget deficits, entitlements, and tax preferences tame the chaos of pure
majoritarianism; weakening those organizational structures in pursuit of greater
fiscal-policy flexibility would undermine institutional stability more broadly. At
the extreme, maximum fiscal-policy flexibility could sharply reduce Congress’s
ability to act at all.
2. Quality of Legislative Information
Legislative organizational structures also improve the quality of legislative
information. Keith Krehbiel’s informational theory maintains that such
structures provide legislators the opportunity and the incentives to invest in
policy expertise.151 Krehbiel argues that legislators act under conditions of
uncertainty about the instrumental relationships between legislative policies and
non-legislative (“real world”) outcomes.152 The legislature therefore establishes
certain organizational structures, such as the committee system, to mitigate the
uncertainty. The reasoning is straightforward. Congress as a whole benefits from
“informational efficiency.”153 But the pursuit of informational efficiency
encounters the usual collective-action problem. Policy expertise is costly to
acquire and, once acquired by any one legislator, is potentially available to all
legislators. Thus, the “benefits of policy expertise will be realized only if

Weingast III]. Some object that Shepsle’s thesis simply pushes the problem of instability back one stage.
Riker posed the objection as one of inherited instability. Riker II, supra note 142, at 444–45. If legislative
organizational structures, rather than policy preferences, induce equilibrium outcomes in a majoritarian
institution, Riker argued, the heterogeneity of policy preferences ought to create instability when the
institution establishes its organizational structures. Id. Levinson puts Riker’s point more bluntly:
“Without some explanation of what stabilizes the supposedly stabilizing institutional structures,
structure-induced equilibrium is a deus ex machina.” Levinson, supra note 51, at 682. But this problem is
easily overstated. The underlying conundrum is the possibility of disequilibrium when a majoritarian
institution acts in multidimensional policy space. Arrow’s Theorem does not predict cycling for decisionmaking in unidimensional policy space when legislators have single-peaked preferences; under those
conditions, a Condorcet winner regularly emerges. RIKER I, supra note 140, at 126; Riker II, supra note
142, at 436–37. Those conditions seem the better fit for modeling the choice about whether to adopt a
particular set of legislative organizational structures and, subsequently, about whether to retain that set
of structures. Most legislators, even those in the minority, have more to lose from legislative chaos than
from an organizational status quo. At a minimum, cycling and chaos jeopardize each legislator’s ability
to participate in the pork-barrel politics that protect incumbency. Thus, when confronted with the
straightforward choice between organizational structure and cycling, most legislators should have a clear
preference for organizational structure. Here, the policy space is unidimensional, and structure is a
Condorcet winner. This helps to explain the inter-temporal stability of legislative organizational
structures, which even Riker conceded. Id. at 445.
151. Cf. David P. Baron, Legislative Organization with Informational Committees, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI.
485, 502 (2000) (explaining a theory of legislative organization incentivizing specialization by
committees). See generally KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (John
E. Jackson & Christopher H. Achen eds., Univ. of Mich. Press 1992).
152. KREHBIEL, supra note 151, at 20.
153. Krehbiel defines “informational efficiency” as “the reduction of uncertainty in the course of the
choice process.” Id. at 74.
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institutional arrangements are such that some legislators have strong incentives
to specialize and to share their expertise with their fellow legislators.”154
By assigning individual legislators to specific committees with independent
jurisdictions, Congress provides legislators the opportunity to develop expertise
in particular policy areas,155 and by establishing and maintaining committees that
cover the entire policy spectrum, the House and the Senate create institutional
reservoirs of specialized knowledge.156 An individual legislator, however,
rationally may not want to reveal policy expertise to the full chamber,
anticipating that the chamber might exploit the expertise to the legislator’s
disadvantage.157 Congress therefore institutionalizes certain parliamentary
prerogatives, such as restrictive floor-voting procedures, that allow committees
to secure outsized gains in final policy outcomes.158 These prerogatives increase
the prospects that the committee will “credibly transmit[] private information to
get a [floor] majority to do what is in the majority’s interest.”159
Again, there is a trade-off to be made in the dis-entrenchment of fiscal policy.
Weakening legislative organizational structures, such as the committee system
and related parliamentary prerogatives, may introduce greater flexibility into
federal fiscal policy. But it may also erode incentives for individual legislators to
invest in the acquisition and maintenance of policy expertise and, accordingly,
degrade the quality of legislative information. The result could be a more flexible
but less informed fiscal policy.
3. Legislative Dealmaking
Legislative organizational structures also facilitate stable dealmaking by
legislators. Distributive theory argues that legislators organize Congress to
produce mutual benefits such as “pork barrel projects, . . . expenditures targeted
to their districts, and policy outcomes desired by favored constituents.”160 The
theory assumes that legislators have heterogeneous policy preferences, that few
such preferences are held by a majority of legislators, and that legislators may
secure gains from trade by exchanging support across different measures.161
Because the “spot market” for trading votes presents problems of enforceability
and long-term stability,162 legislators establish institutional structures to facilitate
both the formation and the enforcement of deals that deliver benefits to their
154. Id. at 64.
155. Id. at 68–69. See also H.R. REP. NO. 93-916, pt. II (1974).
156. KREHBIEL, supra note 151, at 66–81.
157. Id. at 69.
158. Id. at 90–92, 109 n.1. See also Daniel Diermieier, Commitment, Deference, and Legislative
Institutions, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 344 (1995).
159. KREHBIEL, supra note 151, at 76.
160. Shepsle & Weingast III, supra note 150, at 7–8. See also C. Lawrence Evans, Legislative
Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions, 24 LEG. STUD. Q. 605, 608–09 (1999); Barry R. Weingast
& William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are
Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 133 (1988).
161. Weingast & Marshall, supra note 160, at 133, 136–37.
162. Id. at 135, 138–42; Shepsle & Weingast III, supra note 150, at 11.
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constituents.163
Congress addresses the enforcement problems and the transaction costs of
vote-trading through the committee system, which allows members to sort
themselves according to the interests of their constituents.164 Within any single
committee, legislators can make enforceable deals without the need to trade
votes across separate measures.165 Additionally, each committee holds almost
unchecked agenda control over policy matters within its jurisdiction. Distributive
theory thus regards the committee system as “the formal expression of a
comprehensive logrolling arrangement.”166 The committees’ parliamentary
prerogatives strengthen this arrangement. Once a measure has left a committee’s
direct control, floor amendments could undo intra-committee deals and resurrect
the enforceability problems of measure-by-measure vote trades. But the
parliamentary prerogatives stabilize legislative outcomes in favor of committee
preferences.167
Weakening internal organizational structures, therefore, may undermine
legislative dealmaking. This may be desirable in part. Those interested in
reforming fiscal policy may think that undermining pork-barrel spending is
exactly the right path to pursue, and they may be correct. It is also possible,
however, that such legislative deals are needed to help Congress function—that
pork-barrel spending provides the grease that facilitates action in other policy
areas. If legislators cannot form stable logrolling arrangements on spending, they
may not be able to reach agreement on other matters. Again, there is a trade-off
to be made in dis-entrenching fiscal policy.
V
CONCLUSION
The conventional academic debate about legislative entrenchment centers on
hard entrenchment, but hard entrenchment is highly improbable—perhaps
simply impossible—under the constitutional framework for federal legislation.
By contrast, soft entrenchment is far more common. Of particular importance for
fiscal policy is the incidental soft entrenchment induced by the structures of
legislative organization, such as the congressional committee system and
institutional voting procedures. Such structures bring stability to the federal

163. Shepsle & Weingast III, supra note 150, at 12–13; Weingast & Marshall, supra note 160, at 142–
43. See generally Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms, 23 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 245 (1979).
164. Weingast & Marshall, supra note 160, at 143–48.
165. Id.
166. Shepsle & Weingast III, supra note 150, at 11–12 (quoting Morris P. Fiorina, Alternative
Rationales for Restrictive Procedures, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 337, 338 (1987)). See also John Ferejohn,
Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation, in CONGRESS AND
POLICY CHANGE 223, 224–25 (Gerald C. Wright, Jr. et al. eds., 1986).
167. David P. Baron & John Ferejohn, The Power to Propose, in Models of Strategic Choice in
Politics 343, at 353–65 (Peter C. Ordeshook ed., 1989). See also David P. Baron, A Noncooperative Theory
of Legislative Coalitions, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1048, 1081–82 (1989).
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budget process, to social-welfare entitlements, and to tax expenditures;
weakening those structures in order to make fiscal policy more flexible may
compromise internal legislative stability, legislative information, and legislative
dealmaking.

